

ISLAM'S BLOODY INNARDS?
Religion and Political Terror, 1980–2000*

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Abstract

Culturalists claim that political outcomes, such as respect for human rights, should be understood as culturally determined. Others see structures or the short-term strategic behavior of actors as more important. We examine empirically whether majority-Muslim societies suffer higher levels of human rights violations and political terror relative to others. Our results show robustly that countries with larger shares of Catholics fare far worse than all others. A discrete variable measuring membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference predicts lower levels of political terror. Thus, claims about the unique features of Islam in accounting for political repression seem to be highly exaggerated. Consistent with the findings on religion and democracy, our results indicate that it is the Arab region, not religion, that matters, and that political and economic factors matter a whole lot more than do cultural ones. This is good news for policy that seeks to end the scourge of political repression short of revising culture.

(157 words).

Introduction

In July 2004, the leader of the large Norwegian populist party, Carl I. Hagen, in an address to a religious group argued that Jesus Christ was kind to children whereas the Prophet Mohammed would turn them into suicide bombers. Such rhetoric resonates with a large segment of public opinion. The portrayal of Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist by a Danish cartoonist, which led to massive protests in many parts of the world, is emblematic of a Western public's image of Islam. In the post-9/11 world, 'Islamic' terrorists have used suicide-bomb tactics from Bali to London.¹ Recent events have generated public discussion that ties Al Qaeda's ideology to a larger Islamic cultural trait—the use of violence for political ends. Such events play into anti-Muslim immigrant feeling. In former bastions of liberal politics, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and France, high-level political assassinations, violent crime, and riots are discussed with special reference to Muslim immigrants. Discussions of Turkey's bid to join the European Union are illustrative. Europeans view Turkey as a problematic member partly because it is a majority-Muslim country.² Islamic fundamentalists too, including Al Qaeda, point out the repressive nature of 'false' Islamic governments of the Middle East. Does living in a majority-Muslim society expose one to uniquely high levels of political terror and repression? In other words: do societies with a larger percentage of Muslim inhabitants have particularly 'bloody innards' as some culturalists claim? (Huntington 1996: 258).

Discussions about religious-cultural influence have also recently received much attention in several academic fields, particularly relating to questions of economic and political development, democratization, and violent conflict (e.g. Diamond 1994; Esposito 1999; Fish 2002; Fox 2000; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000). Apparently, norms,

values, and attitudes determine political and economic life as much as do formal institutions (Landes 1999; North 1990). Many argue that ‘culture matters’ (Harrison and Huntington 2000; McTernan 2003; Price 1999), and some depict Islamic culture in particular as worrisome, largely due to Islam’s inability to deal with a secularizing, modern world (Barber 1995; Huntington 1996; Hutchinson 2005; Juergensmeyer 2000). Discussions in the West, about tolerance and human rights, are often reduced to contrasting a progressive liberal West with a ‘backward’ Islamic world, which is steeped in tradition (Esposito 1999: 245). This study addresses these debates by empirically examining whether countries with larger shares of Muslims (and ones dominated by Muslims measured as countries with Muslim populations greater than 70%, 80% and 90%) are more likely than others to experience higher levels of state-sponsored repression.

Our central research question is whether the conditions of physical integrity rights of citizens belonging to Islamic societies are worse than others, or if factors unrelated to religion better explain states’ violations of such rights. The level of repression also serves as an indirect proxy for the level of dissent within a society since theorists of repression suggest that governments resort to this form of behavior when threatened by domestic dissent (Poe 2004: 17). In other words, physical manifestations of repression, such as torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment are unlikely to occur with sufficient frequency without some level of dissent that threatens incumbent rulers.³ Consequently, we estimate the relative impact of culture on repression over other factors, such as economic and political ones, so as to determine feasible policy intervention.

Using the most widely-used measures of violent state repression, the physical integrity rights (PIR) index (Cingranelli and Richards 1999) and a scale of political

terror (PTS) (Gibney and Dalton 1996), we find that states with larger shares of Muslims suffer much lower levels of repression relative to societies with larger shares of Catholics. Controlling for several relevant factors including oil exportation and energy wealth, we find that states with a higher share of Muslims are more likely to repress when the reference category is the share of Protestant Christians, but Islamic societies are less repressive than Catholic countries by a wide margin. We find similar results when we use a dichotomized measure of Islamic- and Catholic-dominated states defined as those with over 70% (also 80% and 90%) of the population containing these religions. Muslim-dominated states are no different from Protestants and others while Catholic-dominated states consistently show higher levels of state repression. When regional dummies are introduced, Latin America shows the highest impact on political terror relative to all other regions. It is not Islam and the Middle East that should be treated as unique, if in fact our point of reference is the level of state repression, but Catholicism and Latin America. Fortunately, the substantive impact of religion seems to be much lower than the political-economic variables, such as democracy, per capita income, oil wealth, and civil war. Our results are robust to several different dependent variables, alternative specifications of the model, sample size, and several appropriate testing procedures for cross-section, time-series data and continuous and ordinal data.

Why repress?

It is not obvious why religion should predict the level of repression in a society. We first outline a model of repression from the extant literature on the subject and then discuss the ways in which Islam may relate to such a model. We rely on Steven Poe's (2004) model of why states repress. Poe (2004) integrates the empirical findings in a theory of state behavior derived from Most and Starr's 'opportunity and willingness'

framework for understanding international conflict (Most and Starr 1989).⁴ Human rights practices depend primarily on decisions made by leaders from a menu of choice about how to respond to a perceived or real threat. Leaders who make domestic policy decisions have perceptions of their regime's political strength (S) and the level of threats it faces (T). When decision makers recognize that the government's strength (S) is weaker than the threat (T): $[S_{nt1} < T_{nt1}]$, or that threat (T) is increasing relative to state strength (S): $[S_{nt1}/T_{nt1}] < [S_{nt0}/T_{nt0}]$, then the state will be willing to take action to increase its strength (S) or decrease the threat (T) (Most and Starr 1989: 126–128). Repression is just one of the actions that can be used by leaders who try to decrease threats or/and increase strength. Others too have variously argued some version of this parsimonious model when they have suggested that political leaders are most likely to use repression as means to gain control over serious dissent (Gartner and Regan 1996; Gurr 1986; Landman 2005; Moore 2000).

Given this model, the importance of culture and religion for repression can be conceptualized in two broad ways: On the one hand, particular aspects of a religion may increase the level of dissent from below because religion provides opportunities for challenging incumbent rulers in violent ways. On the other hand, aspects of culture and religion could determine the ways in which rulers respond to threat since social values and beliefs legitimize some actions over others. In the following section we examine more closely the explanations for why Islam matters.

Why Islam?

Islam features prominently in the debate on culture and politics. We first discuss the contesting views on whether culture matters, and then identify explicit arguments in the literature as to why a society with large numbers of Muslims may matter in terms of predicting the level of repression. Huntington argues that there are sharp cultural

differences between the political values of the civilizations of a Western Christian heritage and Islam. He argues that Islam has ‘bloody borders’ as well as ‘bloody innards’ (Huntington 1996: 258). Rather than geostrategic problems, it is *cultural values* that make Islam prone to violence.⁵ Such acts as *jihad* or *fatwah* that include suicide bombing as a legitimate tactic are seen as a civilizational trait of Islam (Friedman 2005). According to some culturalists, democratic, liberal values, or the protection of individual rights and civil liberties from the power of the state, constitute the markers of Western civilization and may not fit well with other traditions (Lal 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2004: 135).

The culturalist approach to understanding the political outcomes of Islam rests on sifting through historical antecedents. As such, they advocate the deep-rooted nature of theology and the culture that has been shaped by it to find the answers to these outcomes (Huntington 1996; Lewis 2003; Pipes 2003). Others suggest that state repression relates to structure, political strategies, short-term strategic questions of power and profit, and that culture is merely an epiphenomenon (Booth and Seligson 2004; Jackman and Miller 1998; Nasr 2005). Many of the public and academic discourses are formed on the basis that Islamic teachings do not show tolerance and discourage the separation of religious and secular life. It is also believed that many Muslims prefer to live under *sharia* law rather than accept liberal values. However, several majority-Islamic states in the Gulf region (notably Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain), and in Asia, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, have been able to reconcile their beliefs while accepting change. Are these states special because they are able somehow to suppress dissent against change that many of the culturalist explanations above expect from a majority-Muslim society? How Islamic societies fare relative to others, is the

crucial question. Next, we examine more closely how exactly Islam may matter for predicting repression.

How might religion matter in determining the level of state repression? One way to answer this is to ask if particular styles of authoritarian rule are culturally conditioned, so that the level of respect for human rights is lower than usual (despite the level of actual threat emanating from dissenters). On the one hand, state elites and the ruling class could be overly sensitive because religious opposition to secular rule is ever present; a pattern identified in the Islamic world (Hafez 2003). Apparently, one cultural trait attributed to Islam is the preference for order over chaos, which legitimizes the use of harsh methods against dissent (Esposito 1999). As a result, Price (1999: 162) claims, “the abusive treatment of citizens by governments became acceptable in many Islamic societies.” In Egypt, for example, “opposition groups are tolerated only as long as they remain relatively weak or accept government control and do not threaten the regime” (Esposito 1999: 244). Several majority-Islamic states, such as Egypt and Algeria are accused of violent suppression of dissent in terms of widespread use of torture, extra-judicial killings, imprisonment without trial, and mass arrests (Esposito 1999; Hafez 2003).

On the other hand, Islam might empower society to challenge state rulers in violent ways. Anti-Western sentiments, particularly over the West’s support for the state of Israel may allow radicals to rally the masses against their ruling elites. The propensity towards radicalism within Islam is also viewed as a function of Islam’s inability to modernize, so that westernized, progressive elites are likely to face opposition from a traditional, radicalized mass. Underwriting all of the above is the suggested link between Islam and the so-called socially sanctioned right of *Jihad*.⁶ This would be the bottom-up effect of Islam where states use repression to contend

with dissent from below, dissent that often forms as violent protest. In fact, some argue that violent Islamic radicalism in secularized states is in fact a direct response to very high levels of repression and social exclusion in many majority Islamic states, particularly in places such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and many other Gulf States (Hafez 2003).

There are of course several other possible links from Islam to violence and repression. The extent to which government policies are infused with religion could explain the level of dissent and repression, particularly when state-sponsored religious dogma clash with the rights of minorities. According to some, the alliance between religion and state is seen as key to understanding the status of human rights in Muslim societies (Mayer 1988). Religion and politics are doctrinally and historically intertwined in Islam (Price 1999: 2), and Muslim states generally have less separation of religion and politics (Fox 2006). Religion is often formally integrated into government policies, as religious laws regulate the personal sphere, such as dress codes and dietary laws, and the banning of ‘infidels’ from holding certain political posts. Also, religion is directly embedded in the court system in countries using *Sharia* laws, where methods of punishment for crime are often brutal, such as public beheading and mutilation. According to systematic data collected by Jonathan Fox and associates, Muslim states stand out in the way religion and state are integrated, and “both Catholic and Protestant states engage less in religious regulation” (Fox 2006: 560). While all or many of the features of Islam identified above may matter, no study that we are aware of has tested whether societies with larger shares of Muslims are any worse than states with majorities of other believers.⁷ If it is Islam, rather than other factors, that really matter then larger shares of Muslim individuals should correlate with the adverse outcomes, such as repression, addressed here.

The empirical literature on the effects of Islam on democracy confirms some of the negative arguments. Apparently, Islamic attitudes towards women in particular makes Muslims culturally non-conducive to modernization (Fish 2002; Karatnycky 2002). Donno and Russett (2004) found that repression of women's rights is indeed more widespread in Islamic countries, particularly the Arab world. Some find that Islam has an independent effect on lower levels of democracy (Fish 2002; Ross 2001). However, Donno and Russett (2004) argue that the effect of culture has changed dramatically over time. Before 1980, predominantly Catholic countries were "even less likely than Islamic ones to have democratic governments, but this relationship subsequently turned strongly positive" (Donno and Russett 2004: 583). They argue that rather than an effect of religion, it is Arab cultural factors that matter.

Mayer (1993) suggests that the Western tendency to believe that Islam is special can "lead to a failure to recognize the common dimensions of human rights issues in Muslim and non-Muslim societies" (Mayer 1993: 117). An overemphasis on Islam can obscure the mechanisms that explain human rights violations in these societies, particularly if other factors more salient to human rights go unacknowledged. Following 9/11 and subsequent events, the tendency to focus negatively on Islam has grown. Thus, addressing this issue systematically is even more pertinent today, using a methodology that holds factors constant across several cultural traits, so that Islam's uniqueness can be estimated more precisely relative to others. Given recent discussions about the effects of religious fundamentalism and religious discrimination on terrorism and violent conflict, testing how the share of a religious population predicts repression is crucial for gaining further insight into how and why religion features in violent political outcomes (Fox 2004; Hafez 2003; Marty and Appleby 1995; Nordås 2004; Reynal-Querol 2002).

Methods, Variables and Data

We examine the most easily measurable, and the most odious aspects of state repression, which are violations of physical integrity rights (PIR) and the extent of political terror (PTS) (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Hafner-Burton 2005).⁸ These rights are negative rights in that they capture arbitrary physical harm and state coercion with threat of harm against ordinary people. While the sources for the two datasets on repression are the same, the correlation is not perfect due to different definitional issues and thresholds. The correlation between Hafner-Burton's (2005) PTS (which measures repression) scale and PIR (which measures rights) is $r = -0.82$.⁹ Generally, there is high congruence among differently-defined scales of repression (Landman 2005). We follow the conservative strategy of using both datasets.

Repression of physical integrity rights (PIR) is coded on the basis of the following four criteria: extrajudicial killings/unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of life, disappearances, torture/inhumane and degrading treatment, and political imprisonment because of political activism and nonviolent opposition to government. These variables are coded on a scale of 0-2 beginning with 0, which is if 50 or more reported violations have occurred. A score of 1 means that 1-49 reportings occurred and 2 means zero reporting of violations. This information is then scaled using Mokken Scaling Analysis (MSA), which bases the scale on the observed frequencies of the type of violations of human rights observed in the data. Thus, the final physical integrity rights measure is an additive scale of the 4 repression categories named above stretching from 0, no respect on any of the categories, to 8, which is full respect for each of the categories. Some violations and partial violations show up on each of the 4 dimensions in between 1 and 7.

The PTS scale rates the yearly performance of countries on an interval scale of 5 categories.

1 if countries are under secure rule of law, political imprisonment and torture are rare, and the political murders are extremely rare;

2 if imprisonment for non-violent political activities is limited, torture and beating are exceptional, and political murder rare;

3 if political imprisonment is extensive, execution and political murder may be common, and detention for political views are acceptable;

4 if the practices of level 3 are expanded to a larger segment of population, murders and disappearances are common, but terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in political practices and ideas

5 if level of terror are population wide, and decision makers do not limit themselves by which they pursue private and ideological goals

We now discuss the control variables.

Our main independent variables are the percentages of the major religions that make up a society (state). The variables are constructed as percentage of Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and other religions, summing to 100 (La Porta et al. 1998). We focus on the most-discussed religions that also make up the largest portion of the states in the world (regardless of territorial extent). This is meaningful for our purposes, since human rights are defined in terms of ‘government’ repression. Thus, how many governments engage in this behavior, rather than numbers of people affected, is our focus. Additionally, we create dichotomous measures to capture aspects of dominance of one or another religion. We create an Islamic-dominance dummy variable taking the value 1 if Muslims are greater than 70% of the population, and 0 if below. We do this at the 80% and 90% population share levels as well. We created similar dummy variables for Catholics, leaving out Protestant- and ‘other’-dominance as reference categories. The data on the share of the population Muslim correlates at $r=0.98$ with similar data presented by Fearon and Laitin (2003). We also

test a dummy variable coded according to membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.¹⁰ This variable correlated at $r=0.83$ with the share of the population Muslim.

Previous studies have found several factors that influence the likelihood of repression. Steven Poe and his associates (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) find that past levels of repression (the human rights legacy), the level of formal democracy, population size, economic standing, and threat of organized violence in the form of involvement in international and civil wars have significant effects on repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Landman 2005; Poe 2004). If civil wars are a real threat to leaders, the justification Poe and associates provide as to why *international* war matters, however, is somewhat vague. One possible explanation might be that the state leaders see an increased need for instituting measures, such as states of emergency, out of concerns over internal dissent, traitors, and saboteurs. However, external crises may lead to ‘rally round the flag’ effects when states shift their focus from domestic to international threats. The empirical evidence on whether international war leads to human rights repression is mixed (Landman 2005; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). We include two controls for armed conflict—civil and interstate war. Using the Uppsala/PRIO dataset that includes all conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002), we compute the number of years of peace since the last conflict for both variables.¹¹

Democracy is an important predictor of respect for human rights (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Landman 2005). The existence of organized, legal, political oppositions, a free press, and a civil society are constraints on leaders who may be tempted to violate citizens’ rights. Established democracies contain norms of non-violent means of conflict resolution, such as protest, strikes, and other civil actions to

make demands on government. Authorities responding to demands are constrained by laws of due process and political oversight. Others argue a curvilinear effect of democracy on repression, where states at intermediate levels of democracy are most likely to be repressive (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Fein 1995). Davenport and Armstrong (2005) find, however, that the effect of democracy linear and negative and most significant when the democracy score is relatively high. Following these writers as well as others, we define our control for regime type as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the Polity IV (variable Polity2) score is above 6 on the 11-point scale (i.e. 7–10) and 0 if below that. In our sensitivity analyses, we test the robustness of our main variables by including democracy defined at various thresholds.

Whether or not countries are petroleum exporters is a crucial control variable when assessing Islam's effects on repression. The fact that 'oil hinders democracy' poses a challenge for testing the effects of religion on repression because resource-rich countries tend to have higher levels of repression, lower levels of democracy, and are largely located in majority-Muslim countries, such as the Middle East and North Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei etc. (Ross 2001). In fact, several find that natural resource wealth is a problem for governance and peace (Auty 2001; de Soysa 2002). Resource wealth raises the stakes for state capture and lowers the incentive of rulers to reform (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). We expect therefore that states that are resource wealthy, such as oil-rich ones, will be more willing to resort to human rights violations than those that are not, and states which are democratic will be less likely (de Soysa and Binningsbø 2006). In other words, since oil-wealthy countries are largely in the Middle East and North Africa, tend to be undemocratic, and are largely Islamic, we will isolate religion's effects from this potential confounding factor. We enter a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if oil

exports are greater than 1/3 of GDP and 0 if not, taken from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) replication dataset.¹² The share of the population Muslim and the oil exporter dummy are correlated at $r = 0.29$, and we also enter a continuous measure of energy rents as a percentage of GDP to assess the sensitivity of the oil-dummy, since this variable correlates with our Islam variable at $r=0.37$ (Bolt, Matete, and Clemens 2002).

Previous research has explicitly controlled for legal traditions of states. Apparently, a British (common law) legal tradition that has independent bureaucracies and court systems constrain arbitrary acts by government (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Likewise, leftist governments too seem to be kinder to human rights (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Since governments may go in and out of office, while repression scores are relatively inert, we use a more permanent measure capturing a socialist legal tradition – a measure that captures socialist law, as coded by La Porta et al. (1998). The exact reason for why socialist states are more likely to respect human rights is unclear except they may be less likely to be challenged due to an ideology that emphasizes class equality, and a unique capacity for social control (state capacity). Thus, the threat level to these states is low while capacity to repress is high, particularly because such states often fell outside the Western sphere of influence. Yet, another argument could be that many of the socialist states did not have open dissent out of fear of Soviet intervention. Our legal system measures are taken from (La Porta et al. 1998).¹³

Economic conditions can affect the likelihood of repression. Poe et al. (1999: 294) state that “in countries with economies characterized by scarcity, regimes will be more likely to repress domestic threats.” Henderson (1997) argues that in more developed states the population will be more content, and thus less repression is

needed to keep control. Richer states also have higher state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, richer people may have high opportunity costs for engaging in dangerous (violent) dissent that threaten states (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). We use Gross National Income per capita (GNI) in PPP terms (logged) and the growth rate of income per capita to capture economic effects (World Bank 2005).

Studies find that countries with larger populations will be more repressive than countries with smaller populations (Landman 2005; Poe 2004). Theoretically, a large population implies larger numbers of potential dissenters and weaker state capacity. A large population generally also means a larger geographical area, which can be more difficult to control than a smaller area (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Poe et al. (1999: 294) argue that “a large or dense population may increase the occurrence of state terrorism by increasing the number of occasions on which threats and coercive acts can occur,” and that having a large population also affects repression because of the strain on available resources. The PIR scores are in fact affected by the size of the population since larger populations can determine the frequency of violations. We also test population density in our sensitivity analyses for gauging the robustness of the basic model. The demographic data are from the World Bank (2005) expressed as total population (logged) and people per square kilometer (logged).

We also enter the level of ethnic heterogeneity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The size of a population and the degree of heterogeneity are correlated. As some argue, governance under conditions of social heterogeneity is supposed to be difficult. The results of ethnicity on repression, however, are mixed (Lee et al. 2004; Walker and Poe 2002). We use a measure of ethnic heterogeneity measuring the degree of fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Others find that a lagged dependent variable (LDV) is highly significant (Poe, 2004). The LDV controls for time dependence and serial correlation, and it presumably captures effects of those factors omitted in the models (Landman 2005). On the other hand, the LDV may soak up so much of the variance that it masks potential causal factors explained by the other variables (Achen 2000; Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). We will test our models with and without LDVs.

Finally, we control for time trends in the data. Human rights data maybe affected over time in several ways, such as the definition of what a human rights violation is. Moreover, the apparatus for detecting violations have increased over time, such as the activities of Amnesty International and the US State Department. We enter year dummies to capture such potential time trends in the data. Time dummies also take care of any unobserved factors, such as the end of the Cold War, or global policy shifts that may affect human rights. We could also have controlled for how committed a country is to the norms of human rights respect by adding a variable measuring whether countries participate in human rights conventions, but the existing evidence suggests that this variable does not matter (Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005). An examination of all of our variables did not show correlations that would lead us to be concerned about multicollinearity (see Table 1).

-----Table 1 about here-----

Table 1 shows that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional dummy and the share of the population Muslim show the highest correlation ($r=0.63$). Hence, we only use these variables together in our robustness checks. The next highest correlation is that between income per capita and democracy ($r=0.52$), but

since income and democracy are often used together and show statistical significance independently, collinearity is probably not a factor. Nevertheless, we examine variance inflation factor (VIF) scores in the sensitivity analyses below.

We estimate our primary dependent variable, the PIR scale using linear regression models (OLS) as well as ordered probit. PIR is an ordinal scale ranging from 0–8, and the ideal estimation process should be either ordered logit or ordered probit, depending on the nature of the distribution of the dependent variable (Long 1997). Estimating a linear model if the thresholds are the same distance apart within the scale would not be such a problem, but given that the substantive nature of the cut-off points are hard to ascertain in the PIR scale, we estimate linear models as some others too have done (Landman 2005; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), but we also test our models using ordered probit. Happily, the closer the scale approaches a normal distribution, the less biased the linear estimator is (Long 1997; Winship and Mare 1984). On preliminary examination, the PIR looks relatively normally distributed, although showing very slight skewness to the right. We follow the safe method of presenting our results based on both estimation techniques and by interpreting the substantive effects relying only on the ordered probit estimates of the PTS scale. We use ordered probit when estimating the PTS since the identification of cut-off points is relatively straightforward.

Additionally, time-series, cross-section data (TSCS) may contain complicated correlation patterns because of the spatial and temporal nature of the data setup. We rely on the ‘panel corrected standard error’ method (PCSE) proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), which provides more accurate, apparently more conservative estimates of significance levels compared to the standard GLS method. PCSE also allows one to correct for autocorrelation with an AR1 process (Beck and Katz 1995). Yet another

estimating technique is the ‘generalized estimation equation’ (GEE) model, which accounts for temporal and spatial correlations in the data (Zorn 2001). Additionally, we estimate a linear regression model clustered on country to obtain Huber-White corrected robust standard errors. With the ordered probit models too, we cluster the analysis on countries and estimate the Huber-White corrected robust standard errors, a method which is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins 1999). Initially, we follow the conservative method of reporting all appropriate estimating techniques but do not report all tests because of limited space.¹⁴ The summary statistics of each of the variables are described in the appendix. The estimates are based on data for 131 countries with over 1 million inhabitants covering the period 1980–2000. The dataset is unbalanced (i.e. the number of countries is not the same for each of the years), and the availability of data for all of the controls determined the size of the dataset (see appendix for country list).

Results

In Table 2, column 1, our replication of others shows highly comparable results despite our slightly altered model. The high levels of significance reflect the fact that we did indeed choose to include those variables others find to be robustly related to repression. The results taken together show that conditions that determine a state’s capacity to respond to threat predicts the level of repression.

-----Table 2 about here-----

Most of the results, except for the legal systems, are significant across the testing procedures, confirming the general robustness of our controls.¹⁵ International war has no statistically significant effect, while years of international peace is

negative and statistically significant. The most reasonable explanation for this somewhat unexpected result is that it is the major powers that have generally engaged in international armed actions in recent years. The results of the baseline model are highly consistent with those of others, using different data, time period, and specifications. Interestingly, oil export dependence, one of the key variables that we introduce, consistently predicts higher levels of repression. This result also supports the view that oil-wealthy states have weak institutions (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Is this effect from oil in fact an effect of religion?

In columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 we enter the share of the population Muslim, Catholic, and other, leaving out the share of Protestants, which serves as the reference category. Both Catholic and Muslim countries tend to have less respect for physical integrity rights than largely Protestant societies. Others too are significantly less respectful of rights, but the share Catholics seem the most robustly negative. In fact, as columns 3 and 4 demonstrate, Islamic societies tend to have higher levels of PIR when the reference category is the share of Catholics. Adding the religious variables has little effect on oil exports, for example. Thus, oil's effect on low human rights seems to be due to other factors. Notice that most of the baseline controls remain the same as before. It seems that the accusations against Islamic societies hold only in comparison with protestant countries. Contrarily, Islamic societies fare very well when compared with largely Catholic countries. Public and scholarly discussion seems to be a bit quick to identify the uniqueness of Islam for predicting levels of dissent and repression, perhaps ignoring the outcomes in Catholic societies. We may in fact be judging Islam through the politics of the Middle East, while ignoring much of what goes on in Catholic countries in Africa and Latin America. If the level of repression of the secular states is what generates radical Islam as some claim (Hafez,

2003), it is surprising that radical Catholicism has not emerged as a global social phenomenon. Is this result due to our use of a linear estimator on the PIR data?

-----Table 3 about here -----

In Table 4 we present results using ordered probit analysis for both dependent variables. We choose to interpret substantive effects based on the PTS. Interpreting marginal effects (elasticities) is relatively straightforward with the PTS because the identification of the cut-off point is less ambiguous than with the PIR scale. We select 4 as our cut-off as it captures the point at which political terror is widespread and affects those engaged in political activism (see definition above). As seen there, the share of the population Muslim is positively related to respect for physical integrity and negatively with ‘political terror’ (the left-out category is ‘Catholic’). The results obtained with the linear estimator uphold when using ordered probit. The results hold also with a lagged dependent variable (columns 2 and 4). Except for some very slight variation, the controls are the same with the ordered-probit estimations as it was with the linear estimations; the exception is that the legal variables do not matter at all.

-----Table 4 about here -----

What about substantive effects? We first calculate a baseline predicted probability for cut-off point 4 for the model presented in Table 4, column 3. The baseline prediction is calculated with all variables at their mean values. Next, we vary each of our variables of interest from their mean values to the mean plus a standard deviation and re-compute the predicted probability with the other variables held at

their means. The discrete variables, such as democracy and civil war, vary from 0 to 1. Computing the average predicted probability at cut-off point 4 with the share of the population Muslim increased by a standard deviation with all other variables assessed at their means, lowers the average predicted probability by 37%. A similar increase in the share of the population Protestant reduces the average predicted probability by 30%, which suggests that relative to Catholics and others, Islam has a slightly larger effect on reducing political terror, even when compared with the share of Protestants.

A comparison of the religious variables with civil war, per capita income, oil exporters, and level of democracy is telling. Raising income by a standard deviation reduces the average predicted probability by 73%, which constitutes more than double the impact of the religious variables. Likewise, going from an autocracy to democracy reduces this average by 70%. If a country moves from being a non-oil producer to an oil producer, then the change in the baseline average increases by 94%. Most significantly, the baseline predicted probability increases by 413% if a country goes from peace to civil war.

These substantive effects suggest that religion, though important, has far smaller effects than political economy ones, which is good news for policy. Perhaps, repression in the Middle East is driven by the nature of autocracy under conditions of oil wealth, rather than by some unique feature of religion. Our results show in fact that Islam may be a countervailing force. Questions of geopolitics, the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the 'resource curse', autocratic politics, civil violence, and other factors perhaps determine the level of dissent and repression, which opinion seems to attribute to religion.

Using the PTS and ordered probit, we test several other variables to ensure robustness of our finding.¹⁶ First, we add regional dummies. The religious variables

lose significance when all regions are included with the category Western left out.¹⁷ Latin America is by far the strongest predictor of political terror of all regions. The MENA regional dummy is positively related to political terror and is statistically highly significant (coefficient = -.77, $p < .005$), a result also reported by others (Landman 2005). However, the share of the population Muslim retains the negative and significant effect, as does oil exports. In fact, the effect of Muslim societies becomes even stronger against the share of Protestants when MENA is added. Clearly, it is the regional effects of the Middle East, not the share of the population Islamic that helps us understand the nature of human rights violations, a point also made about women's rights (Donno and Russett 2004).

Next, we drop oil and democracy from the model respectively, but our result on share of Muslims does not change. Dropping the conflict variables too has no effect on the basic result on Islam. We exchange our oil exporter dummy for a continuous measure of energy rents to GDP (Bolt, Matete, and Clemens 2002), since it could be argued that our choice of oil exports above 1/3rd of GDP is arbitrary. This variable is also positively and highly significantly related to the PTS, which is support for 'resource curse' theories about oil and repression.¹⁸ Despite this highly significant energy wealth variable, the share of the population Muslim continues to show a strong negative effect on political terror. We tried democracy at several different cut-offs on the Polity2 scale. Adding a dummy defining democracy above 8 made the Protestant variable insignificant while Islam retained its statistically significant effect, proving once again its robustness. Neither did the reported effects change when defining democracy at the low end of 3 and above, nor when adding the Polity2 scale without dichotomizing.

Additionally, we ran diagnostics using the regression-cluster method. There was little sign of multicollinearity, as the mean variance inflation factor scores were always less than 2, and none of the individual variables reached the problematic score of 10 (Hamilton 1992; Stata Corporation 2003). Heteroskedasticity is accounted by clustering on country. However, we ran the models without clustering and examined the residuals. The standardized residuals did not depart from normality. We also checked Cook's D values to eliminate problems of influential observations. Running the model without several data points with values above the cutoff of $4/n$ made little change to the results reported above. In fact, the results on Islamic societies gained even more statistical significance ($p < .0001$) when high Cook's D values were left out of the analysis.

Thus far, we have tested the impact of the share of Muslims, finding that a large share of Muslim people relative to Catholics, Protestants, and others predicts lower levels of repression. The effect of the share, however, does not adequately capture how dominant Muslims are in any given country. Thus, we also test a dichotomous variable of Muslim-dominance by assigning the value 1 if Muslims make up more than 70% of the population and 0 if not. In almost all the different specifications of our models and testing method, this dichotomous measure is statistically not different from 0, while the dummy variable for Catholic dominance always predicts higher repression and is statistically significant. These results remain unchanged when we enter dummy variables measuring the population share above the 80% and 90% thresholds as well. When we enter the dummy variable for Organization of the Islamic Conference testing physical integrity rights, the result is positive and highly significant ($p < .0001$).

We relied on a parsimonious model of the threat/capacity ratio to situate the issue of culture and repression. Our results taken together do not suggest that Islam is uniquely prone to the dissent-repression outcomes that some in the literature suggest relates to religion. Repression of the basic human rights of physical integrity is not more pronounced in Islamic countries than in Catholic ones. This indicates that repression is not somehow more legitimate, nor dissent more threatening in majority Islamic states.

We have only examined religion's effect on a particular variety of human rights violations, although one with serious implications for society and polity. Future studies may also look at other aspects of human rights, such as economic and gender rights. Case-study based research could also examine the institutional bases of social control and interest mediation in Islamic societies and why such factors may be weaker in majority Catholic states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Questions of the quality of institutions and repression, and institutional factors relating to colonial heritage based on recent work on European settler patterns, may also be extended fruitfully to human rights studies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Our empirical analyses clearly support those who argue that there is little in Islam that militates against the possibility of decent governance, for political compromise, and institutionalized political competition, as many have argued (Hafez 2003; Mayer 1993; Nasr 2005; Tessler 2002).

Conclusion

Popular opinion, high political discourse, and several segments of scholarly discussion in the social sciences point to the uniqueness of Islam, often in rather disparaging terms. Discussions around the fight against Al Qaeda, immigration-related problems, Middle Eastern wars, and the question of Turkey's possible entry

into the European Union are laced with concerns about Islam's propensity for breeding religious fanaticism, and the inability of Islamic societies and states to modernize and embrace values compatible with Western-style, liberal democracy. Islam is apparently antithetical to individual rights and the respect for personal liberties. We also address a parallel debate about whether or not culture, rather than strategic behavior, matters when explaining political life. The policy import of this issue is enormous—if culture is what explains the level of political repression in a society, then there is little room for intervention from a policy perspective, and the process of change if it even gets in motion could span generations. Fortunately, our estimates show that there is a lot of room for policy that could have more immediate effects.

We have examined the data to see if populations with higher shares of Muslims and those dominated by Muslims (above 70% of population) suffer higher levels of repression of personal integrity rights. Our results show that Islamic societies do better than majority Catholic ones, controlling importantly for energy wealth and sundry controls. These results do not change when we include a regional dummy for the MENA region, but our results suggest that the MENA region has an independent effect on political terror net of oil wealth and the lack of democracy—but Islam does not seem to be what matters. In fact, a dummy variable capturing membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference predicts lower levels of political terror. In other words, those Islamic countries that have joined a world body based on religious affiliation have a better human rights record as a group relative to others. There might in fact be little to learn from juxtaposing the theologies of Jesus Christ and the Prophet Mohammed for understanding the nexus between dissent repression, as some scholars and populist politicians are want to do.

Apparently, one of the strongest predictors of why people are intolerant comes from real and perceived ‘threats to a way of life’ (Gibson 2006). The current discussion on Islam contains such a tone. Our results certainly question the utility of framing issues around religious/cultural generalities. Policies based on the fear of Islam may itself violate human rights and undermine democracy when Muslim immigrants are treated differently, when Muslims applicants for asylum and sanctuary face added barriers, and people are unfairly treated because of religious affiliation. As recent reports indicate, based on the fear of Islam, the actions of Russian authorities against some Muslim regions mirror the old Soviet Union, which may be counterproductive to peace and justice (Myers 2005). Our empirical results challenge those who view Islamic societies as uniquely ‘bloody,’ given to high levels of repression due to cultural conditions. If culture matters, then the old Protestant-Catholic differences highlighted by Max Weber still seems to be more problematic when predicting bad political outcomes—more so than any Christian-Muslim one.

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Table 1. Correlation matrix of selected variables

	PTS	%Islam	%Prot	%Cath	%Other	MENA	Democ	Income/ pc	Oil Exp.
PIR	-0.82	-0.19	0.32	0.0076	0.0010	-0.11	0.41	0.41	-0.14
PTS	--	0.19	-0.28	0.0095	-0.018	0.082	-0.41	-0.45	0.14
%Islam		--	-0.34	-0.51	-0.32	0.63	-0.40	-0.20	0.29
%Prot			--	-0.12	-0.13	-0.22	0.25	0.22	-0.03
%Cath				--	-0.49	-0.32	0.31	0.16	-0.042
%Other					--	-0.21	-0.062	-0.10	-0.25
MENA						--	-0.18	0.18	0.35
Democ							--	0.52	-0.18
Income/pc								--	0.02
Oil Exp.									--

Table 2. Baseline model explaining respect for physical integrity rights using PIR, 1981–2000

	(1) PCSE	(3) REG (cl)
	Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)
Oil dummy	-0.518	-0.491
Oil > 1/3 of GDP	(4.37)***	(2.10)**
Ln Income per capita	0.479	0.467
	(9.31)***	(4.83)***
Econ. growth	0.004	0.006
	(0.74)	(0.80)
Democracy dummy	1.075	1.201
	(8.97)***	(7.72)***
British legal system	0.278	0.256
	(2.92)***	(1.49)
Socialist legal system	0.367	0.369
	(1.90)*	(1.24)
Ethnic fraction.	0.721	0.814
	(3.79)***	(2.16)**
Ln Total Population	-0.438	-0.391
	(14.39)***	(6.71)***
Civil war	-1.390	-1.851
	(10.84)***	(8.45)***
Civil peace years	0.034	0.030
	(10.85)***	(5.36)***
Interstate war	0.148	-0.350
	(0.89)	(1.31)
Interstate peace years	-0.015	-0.016
	(4.22)***	(2.86)***
Year	-0.065	
	(5.09)***	
Constant	137.075	7.315
	(5.38)***	(5.67)***
Observations	2,366	2,366
No. of states	132	132
R-squared		0.57

z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

--results for individual year dummies not reported

Table 3. Religion and respect for physical integrity rights (PIR), 1981–2000

	(1)PCSE	(2)REG(c1)	(3)PCSE	(4)REG(c1)
	Physical Integrity Rights	Physical Integrity Rights	Physical Integrity Rights	Physical Integrity Rights
%muslim	-0.006 (3.44)***	-0.004 (1.29)	0.006 (3.10)***	0.007 (2.29)**
%catholic	-0.013 (6.25)***	-0.011 (3.28)***		
%other	-0.009 (4.51)***	-0.007 (1.72)*	0.004 (2.44)**	0.004 (1.05)
%protestant			0.013 (6.25)***	0.011 (3.28)***
Oil dummy	-0.564 (4.78)***	-0.547 (2.42)**	-0.564 (4.78)***	-0.547 (2.42)**
Ln Income per capita	0.460 (9.16)***	0.452 (4.75)***	0.460 (9.16)***	0.452 (4.75)***
Econ. growth	0.004 (0.77)	0.007 (0.91)	0.004 (0.77)	0.007 (0.91)
Democracy dummy	1.127 (8.91)***	1.290 (7.90)***	1.127 (8.91)***	1.290 (7.90)***
British legal system	0.149 (1.74)*	0.126 (0.69)	0.149 (1.74)*	0.126 (0.69)
Socialist legal system	0.303 (1.46)	0.300 (0.83)	0.303 (1.46)	0.300 (0.83)
Ethnic fraction.	0.681 (3.71)***	0.791 (2.11)**	0.681 (3.71)***	0.791 (2.11)**
Ln Total Population	-0.410 (13.96)***	-0.367 (6.51)***	-0.410 (13.96)***	-0.367 (6.51)***
Civil war	-1.392 (10.75)***	-1.842 (8.80)***	-1.392 (10.75)***	-1.842 (8.80)***
Civil peace years	0.033 (10.68)***	0.029 (5.04)***	0.033 (10.68)***	0.029 (5.04)***
Interstate war	0.097 (0.58)	-0.402 (1.52)	0.097 (0.58)	-0.402 (1.52)
Interstate peace years	-0.011 (3.11)***	-0.011 (2.06)**	-0.011 (3.11)***	-0.011 (2.06)**
Year	-0.067 (5.34)***		-0.067 (5.34)***	
Constant	141.898 (5.66)***	7.738 (6.25)***	140.637 (5.60)***	6.593 (5.07)***
Observations	2,357	2,357	2,357	2,357
No. of states	131	131	131	131
R-squared		0.58		0.58

z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. --results for individual year dummies not reported

Table 4. Tests of Religion and repression in ordered probit models using Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and the Political Terror Scale (PTS), 1980–2000

	(1) PIR	(2) PIR	(3) PTS	(4) PTS
%muslim	0.005 (2.51)**	0.003 (2.32)**	-0.006 (2.73)***	-0.004 (2.65)***
%protestant	0.013 (3.55)***	0.010 (3.78)***	-0.008 (1.86)*	-0.006 (2.16)**
%other	0.003 (0.99)	0.001 (0.88)	-0.005 (1.81)*	-0.003 (1.66)*
Oil exporter	-0.371 (2.45)**	-0.241 (2.77)***	0.425 (2.71)***	0.237 (2.77)***
Ln Income pc	0.342 (4.85)***	0.222 (5.64)***	-0.499 (6.27)***	-0.288 (6.38)***
Econ growth	0.005 (0.95)	0.008 (1.88)*	-0.005 (0.89)	-0.014 (2.46)**
Democracy dummy	0.903 (7.91)***	0.481 (6.48)***	-0.983 (8.61)***	-0.576 (7.46)***
Brit. Legal	0.010 (0.07)	-0.072 (0.83)	-0.075 (0.49)	0.013 (0.15)
Socialist legal	0.213 (0.88)	0.096 (0.72)	-0.063 (0.29)	0.001 (0.01)
Ethnic fraction	0.606 (2.15)**	0.315 (1.96)**	-0.701 (2.37)**	-0.408 (2.48)**
Ln Population	-0.238 (6.26)***	-0.127 (6.06)***	0.238 (5.34)***	0.121 (4.88)***
Civil war	-1.084 (7.55)***	-0.653 (7.61)***	1.073 (7.32)***	0.749 (7.12)***
Civil peaceyrs	0.021 (5.21)***	0.008 (3.69)***	-0.025 (5.39)***	-0.010 (3.33)***
Interstate war	-0.241 (1.40)	0.011 (0.07)	0.439 (1.78)*	0.210 (1.49)
Int. peaceyrs	-0.007 (1.83)*	-0.003 (1.27)	0.009 (1.98)**	0.004 (1.57)
PIR_lagged1		0.495 (21.25)***		
PTS_lagged1				1.236 (19.24)***
Observations	2357	2224	2469	2444
N	131	131	131	131

Robust z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
year dummies computed in all tests (not shown)

Appendix

Summary statistic

Variable	obs	mean	st.dev.	min	max
Physical Integrity Rights	2,357	4.9	2.3	0	8
Political Terror	2,339	2.4	1.1	1	5
Energy rent/gdp	2,222	6.7	16.8	1	320.8
%muslim	2,357	23.1	34.9	0	99.4
%muslim(F&L)	2,234	25.2	36.4	0	100
%protestant	2,357	12.5	20.5	0	97.8
%catholic	2,357	31.2	35.6	0	96.9
%other	2,357	33.2	31.6	0.3	100
Oil exporter	2,357	0.15	0.4	0	1
Ln Income/pc	2,357	8.1	1.1	5.7	10.4
Econ. growth/pc	2,357	0.84	5.6	-42.9	30.8
Democracy	2,357	0.46	0.5	0	1
British legal sys.	2,357	0.33	0.5	0	1
Socialist legal sys.	2,357	0.1	0.3	0	1
Ethnic fraction.	2,357	0.4	0.3	0.004	0.93
Ln total population	2,357	16.1	1.5	12.7	20.9
Civil war	2,357	0.18	0.38	0	1
Civil peace yrs	2,357	20.9	17.3	0	54
Interstate war	2,357	0.03	0.18	0	1
Interstate peace yrs	2,357	24.4	15.5	0	54

Countries in sample:

Western Hemisphere—United States, Canada, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay

Europe & Central Asia—United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Albania, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan

Sub-Saharan Africa—Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Mauritania, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Rep., Congo Dem. Rep., Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Madagascar, Mauritius

North Africa & Middle East—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates

Asia—China, Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, India, Bhutan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia

Oceania—Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Fiji

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- ¹ The European Union decided to ban the term 'Islamic terrorism' because it was too emotive, since terrorism by Protestant fundamentalists, Hindus, Buddhists, and Catholics are rarely prefaced by the religious denomination (Beunderman 2006).
- ² Ironically, Serbia, a country against which NATO went to war for preventing genocide, has a greater chance of joining Europe than Turkey, a NATO ally!
- ³ We do of course acknowledge that repression by states without a real threat is also possible.
- ⁴ This model assumes that decision makers are unified and value-maximizing actors who possess perfect information regarding their options and the consequences of their actions (Most and Starr, 1989: 126).
- ⁵ Despite Huntington's highly publicized argument, the empirical evidence for 'bloody borders' between Islamic and other cultures does not seem to hold (Henderson 1997; Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000; Tuscisny 2004).
- ⁶ On whether it is Islam rather than other convictions that may have driven the September 11th hijackers to crash planes into buildings in the US, see (Holmes 2005).
- ⁷ Some political scientists (Chehabi and Linz 1998) identify a unique brand of autocratic regime, which they term 'sultanistic.' Despite the reference to the Ottoman Empire and its heritage, the large majority of their cases are Catholic countries in Latin America and Africa. Only Iran is presented as a 'sultanistic' regime that is Islamic.
- ⁸ The reader should refer to <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp> for detailed descriptions of the physical integrity rights data, sources, and methodology.
- ⁹ The PTS (Political Terror Scale) is collected by Mark Gibney (Gibney and Dalton 1996). These data are available at <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/gibney.html>. We use the PTS data adapted by Hafner-Burton (2005). Her data are available at www.stanford.edu/~emilieh/.
- ¹⁰ We obtained the list of member states from the official website: <http://www.oic-oci.org/>
- ¹¹ The peace years variables were calculated using the BTSCS program working in Stata (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).
- ¹² The data are available at: <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/>
- ¹³ We might also have entered a term for *Sharia* law. However, since *Sharia* is only one aspect of how a majority-Islamic society might suffer repression, we do not control for it. In other words, controlling for it is analogous to examining the effects of smoking on illness while controlling for lung disease.
- ¹⁴ We use the statistical software package STATA v9 in all estimations. The do files containing all tables and the sensitivity analyses together with the data are available at <http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/Indra.de.Soyas/default.htm> and at http://www.isanet.org/data_archive.html.
- ¹⁵ The effects of having a British legal system, rather than socialist, seems most robust as it only just misses significance at the 10% level.
- ¹⁶ Results not shown. All results may be generated from the do files made available with replication data (see footnote 13).
- ¹⁷ The regional dummies are taken from the Fearon and Laitin (2003) replication data.
- ¹⁸ Logged and non-logged terms yield similar results.